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„Introduction: Reading Animals‟ 
 
The interest in animals within the Humanities is emerging as a new and important 
area of study. Scholars and students are turning away from what was regarded as 
the unquestionably central figure of the human in a range of different disciplines, 
and the animal is being brought into a new and important focus. In different ways, 
and using a wide variety of materials, the place of animals and humans is being re-
addressed. The animal is no longer confined to ethical debates within philosophy, it 
has become an issue in the study of literature, visual art, history, geography, 
cultural studies; the list could go on. 
 But there is, perhaps, one central question which faces all of us who are 
working on animals in the Humanities, whatever our disciplinary context. That 
question is: what can our work do to change current perceptions? On one level 
change is needed within the academy itself. There is a perception held by some 
colleagues that the idea of „working on animals‟ is eccentric, archaic: I remember 
very clearly how furious I was when about eight years ago a fellow graduate student 
at Sussex University told me that it was „nice‟ that I could still write a thesis on 
bear-baiting in early modern England, as if this area of research was mere 
antiquarianism, and not in any way theoretically engaged. As many recent books 
and articles show, reading animals is not a new form of an old, rather dusty kind of 
scholarship - a gathering together of interesting anecdotes -  rather, it is an area of 
research which is revealing many new insights into some very significant areas of 
interest to the Humanities, particularly about the nature of the human and the 
human relationship with nature.1 What emerges in work focusing on animals is a 
new way of thinking about some established ideas. For a start, the notion of the 
human itself comes under a new, and revealing scrutiny. 
 However, more important than this academic (purely academic?) issue is the 
question of the ethical role of writing about animals. What does re-reading the 
history of human relationships with animals tell us about how we should think 
about the non-human animal now? What function does reading literature which 
represents animals have at a time of real dangers and real struggles against 
extinction and exploitation in the non-human animal world? These questions are 
crucial to the development of this area of study, and if we cannot answer them then 
reading animals (I return to look at this phrase later) becomes just another angle for 
research, another shelf-filling strategy by academics.  
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 There is, I want to argue, clearly much more to an intellectual engagement 
with the representation of animals  than this, and it is perhaps worth thinking 
briefly about the meaning of the animal in the Humanities at the moment. As the 
main focus of this issue is upon cultural production - the written word, visual art - I 
will focus on how reading animals can be conceptualised in terms of recent 
theoretical developments, or rather, how one recent theoretical development - 
ecocriticism - offers both possibilities and limitations for those of us engaged in 
reading animals.  
 
Reading animals and anthropocentrism 
 
Before getting to this theoretical discussion, however, the concept of „reading 
animals‟ itself needs to be considered. As a way of conceptualising a large and fast 
growing area of research it is immediately problematic in that it places the non-
human animal as the object of research, rather than as the subject. Or, to put it 
another way, instead of undercutting the dominion of humanity, reading animals 
actually reveals the continuing centrality of humanity: the various 
anthropocentrisms which the study of animals should be attempting to counter are 
reproduced in its very act of being. We read animals as if they were texts, just as 
human cultures have exploited animals as if they were objects. There is potentially, 
to extend this analogy, a terrifying symmetry, therefore, between writing a history 
and baiting a bear; between reading a poem and hunting a fox, and this is an 
analogy which the acts of writing and reading would wish, hope, to deny.  
 This is a genuine problem, not least because one of the main intentions of 
many of us engaged in reading animals is that it should upset the assumed 
centrality of the human vision; should slant the gaze in a new and challenging way. 
But if reading animals always-already reproduces one of the central ideas which it 
attempts to counter, then how can it stand against anthropocentrism? Are we not 
engaged in a form of deconstructive analysis (deconstructive of anthropocentrism) 
which can itself be deconstructed? Keith Tester has noted a similar paradox in 
animal rights literature, and much of what he says might also be applicable to an 
ecocriticism concerned with animals. In Animals and Society Tester writes: 
 
 it would be interesting, and not too deliberately polemical, to explore the 
hypothesis that animal rights is not concerned with animals at all; that, on 
the contrary, the idea says rather more about society and humans. Animal 
rights might really be about social actions and only incidentally focus on 
animals.2 
 
Likewise we can argue that reading animals has an ethical position, but the ethics 
are always potentially compromised by the paradox which exists at its heart. 
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Reading animals is always going to have to in some ways relegate the animal to the 
status of a text, something there to be read, interpreted. This is always the case 
because - with the exception of an archaeological or evolutionary history of animals, 
which might concern itself with the remains of real animals - reading animals in 
historical and cultural texts is always going to be reading human representations of 
animal lives. We have yet to find a document created by an animal which can be 
interpreted aright. We can attempt to read mating rituals, the marking of territories, 
but we have only our own meanings to apply, not the animals‟ own; we have only 
our own perceptions not theirs. Who is to say that a display of tail feathers, a toad‟s 
swollen throat really means what we say it does? Only the animal can know that, 
but we can never know the animal. For this reason any study of animals is always 
going to be a study of texts created by humans, and so it makes sense, to return to 
Tester‟s work, that any theoretical position concerning animals is always going to 
concentrate on the humans who are (in liberal animal-rights speak) the agents.  
 But this does not mean that we should accept that reading animals is always 
doomed to failure, and this is where we must depart from Tester‟s assertion of the 
futility of trying to think ethically about animals. He takes the impossibility of a 
non-anthropocentric vision to an extreme which is, I think, highly questionable in a 
number of ways. To put it simply, he argues that all philosophical positions 
concerning the human relation to animals - whether the utilitarian-liberationist line 
of Peter Singer, the ecological outlook of Stephen Clark, or the liberal view of Tom 
Regan - can be rendered meaningless.3 Moving through some of the most important 
work on the human relation to the animal of this century, by Elias, Thomas, Lorenz, 
Lévi-Strauss, Midgley, Douglas, Leach (the list could go on), he argues that there is 
a paradox at the heart of any writing about animals, animal rights philosophies 
included, and that ultimately the latter must themselves be questioned on the 
grounds of logic. 
 
 Think for a moment about who asserts animals‟ rights. Is it a laboratory 
rabbit, veal calf, or hunted fox? Not at all. Animal rights is exclusively 
asserted by society and it is intended to restrain human practices. It says that 
animals are morally the same as humans, and then asks humans to treat 
them as if they were human; it is up to us to struggle for animal rights 
because animals cannot fight for themselves. In other words, they are 
different. Animal rights classifies animals as non-moral objects which are 
metonymical to moral (human) subjects, and as a metaphorical society which 
is morally relevant since human society is morally relevant. Society thinks 
about animals to think about itself. If animals were not given rights, the 
classificatory distinctions between the human and the animal would be 
threatened with collapse.4 
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Tester then takes this logic into an analysis of vegetarianism: 
 
 Most people probably think that „vegetarian‟ is derived from „vegetable-arian‟; 
that is, they think it means a person who eats plants. They are wrong. The 
word was deliberately coined from the Latin vegetus which means whole, 
sound, fresh, and lively. Vegetarianism has always involved a concern with 
natural well-being and health. It has never really been about carrots and 
turnips at all.5 
 
Logically speaking animal rights are about humans under another name; 
etymologically speaking vegetarianism is about health and self-preservation. 
Morality, for Tester, does not come into it because morals are not a part of the logic 
he is applying. 
 In Natural Relations Ted Benton offers a succinct reply to what he calls these 
„daft‟ views. In response to Tester‟s extended logic which proposes that „a fish is only 
a fish if it is classified as one‟ Benton writes „perhaps, if we were to impose the 
socially produced category of fish upon the viper its bite would lose its venom?‟6 
There is, Benton argues, a real animal which exists outside of the possibilities of 
Tester‟s stance, and, in parallel, I want to argue that there is a morality at stake in 
vegetarianism which Tester ignores. The signifier „vegetarian‟ may be etymologically 
traced back to its original signified, self-preservation, rather than to an 
acknowledgement of a vegetable diet, but  if, as Saussure said, meaning is made 
through custom, „general acceptance‟,7 then the meaning of vegetarianism must 
take in its current usage: the signifier can come to represent a kind of ethics not 
contained in the original use of the signified. To deny morality here, as Tester does, 
is clearly misreading the sign. 
 This separation of the original meaning of the signifier and current meaning of 
the signified in the term „vegetarian‟ can also allow us a way of thinking about the 
possibility of reading animals ethically. On the one hand there is the original, the 
anthropocentric objectification of animals - they are texts for interpretation - and 
with that, the further aggrandising of humanity; on the other hand, however, there 
is the possibility that the interpretations, the results of the objectification, might in 
fact work to undo the aggrandisement. I have argued elsewhere, that reading 
anthropocentrism is not necessarily the same as being anthropocentric; in fact, 
reading anthropocentrism can uproot the possibility of its existence.8  
 In her influential study of vegetarianism and feminist thought, The Sexual 
Politics of Meat, Carol J. Adams argues that in meat-eating animals become absent 
referents. „Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist.‟9 
The reminders of lived existence, the abattoir,  and slaughter must all be removed 
for flesh to become a pleasurable object for consumption. Adams is surely right in 
this, but in other areas of human interaction with animals a reversal of this process 
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takes place. In fact, one of the most constant sites of interaction between humans 
and animals always calls on the continued and meaningful presence of the animal. 
When humans proclaim their own status, show that they are human, the animal is 
always invoked as that which the human is not. But in this invocation the animal is 
always a presence to be denied rather than an absence which is forgotten. Where we 
must forget the animal to be able to eat it, we must remember the animal in order to 
be able to deny it and be human. And it is this paradox of anthropocentrism - its 
reliance on and simultaneous denial of animals - which reveals it to be constantly, 
and seriously, threatened, even as it appears to  proclaim that anthropos is always 
central, never under threat. 
 Thus, while recognising that reading animals is about humans as much as, if 
not more than, animals I do not think that this means that we are not engaging with 
a moral issue, not engaging the question of the ethical treatment of animals. What 
we are engaging with is the unquestionable sense that the relationship with the 
animal can only be understood through the ideas, attitudes, worries of the human 
agents. If we refuse to recognise human centrality then we close down the subject of 
the animal altogether, and without reassessing what is assumed to be natural - 
human superiority - there can be little change. 
 It is for this reason that I see reading animals as entering an ethical debate. 
To look at the human is not to acknowledge the defeat of the possibility of an 
interest in animals, it is to return to the source. If we can trace the constructed (as 
opposed to natural) nature of our relation to animals then we might be able to 
change it. To question the authority of anthropocentrism raises questions about the 
human relation to the animal. And these are questions which are, I think, worth 
asking. 
 
Ecocriticism and Animals 
 
There is emerging within the humanities at the moment a new interest in 
environmental issues, a desire for an engagement with the environmental, the 
ecological, and ultimately the ethical. The nature of that engagement is still being 
played out, and it is worth pausing to think about some of the ideas, issues and 
implications which the debates within ecocritical studies in the humanities are 
currently throwing up. At the heart of the debate, I suspect, is the as yet unvoiced 
question of the broader role of the humanities in culture. What can reading texts - 
whether literary, visual or historical - do in the twenty-first century? What is the 
point of the humanities? This is clearly far too big a question to attempt to answer 
here, but we can begin to think about one of the ways in which an answer has been 
proposed. I am concentrating here on the place of environmentalism within the 
study of literature, but I hope that many of the implications which can be drawn out 
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of this area of the Humanities might remain relevant for scholars working in other 
fields. 
 One of the most high profile texts in the critical debate about the relation of 
the humanities to the environment in the UK is Jonathan Bate‟s Romantic Ecology 
(1991).10 Bate‟s book is particularly important in that it has introduced the 
possibility of engaging with environmental concerns within canonical English 
courses, as opposed to an environmental concern being voiced at the margins of 
literary study. And whatever my criticisms of the book may be, it is worth 
recognising this aspect of Bate‟s work: it is a significant advertisement for 
ecocriticism within the academy. However, having said that, it is also worth 
remembering that Bate himself figures the book as a sketch, not a complete 
landscape painting. He writes that it „might be described as a preliminary sketch 
towards a literary ecocriticism‟.11 This is important, because there are issues in 
Bate‟s representation of the natural world which are particularly problematic for 
those of us writing about animals, and it is worth thinking about how an 
ecocriticism concerned with animals can use his ideas to think about future 
developments. 
 Put simply Bate reads the Romantics as a way into reassessing our current 
relation to the natural world: he is offering, in Hegelian terms, the past as a vision 
for the future.12 Bate argues that in Wordsworth‟s poetry can be traced a true 
relation with the land and that it is the work of the ecocritic to outline this true 
relation because through it we can begin to rethink our current relation with the 
natural world. There is a sense of a lost world, an Edenic relation which must be 
reclaimed. Nostalgia for a lost Romanticism, it would seem, is a way forward. 
 In parallel to Bate‟s work Greg Garrard calls on Stephen Clark‟s belief that 
„The proper mode of thought, if only we can recover it, is that of peasants deeply 
rooted in the soil‟.13 Dwelling, a Heideggerian term, is invoked to define this 
idealised relationship. But the return to a lost Eden is, like all other arcadian ideas, 
backward-looking and mythical: there never was such a perfection.14 And the notion 
of the „implausibility‟ of dwelling which is acknowledged even by those who 
pronounce its necessity - the term comes from Garrard - underlines a sense of the 
unsatisfactory nature of this kind of critical response.15 Can an ethical criticism 
really base itself on a mythical and implausible idealism? The desire to return to a 
lost past which Romantic Ecology hints at immediately presents problems for an 
attempt at a truly ecological step forward. 
 As well as some of the dangers of nostalgia, what is also problematic in the 
kind of links between the environment and the humanities made in Bate‟s work is 
the unacknowledged closeness some of his arguments bear to the Thomist line on 
the human relation with the non-human. At one point in Romantic Ecology Bate 
quotes from Ruskin‟s Modern Painters: „supposing all circumstances otherwise the 
same with respect to two individuals, the one who loves nature most will be always 
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found to have more faith in God than the other.‟16 The natural world in this instance 
completes the human world: gives access to the supernatural. For Ruskin this is the 
reason we should respect nature.17 There is no sense of the natural world as 
valuable in and of itself: in Romantic representation the natural world is understood 
as a way in which humans can realise their true humanity. Implicitly Bate assents 
to this idea.  
 In Summa Theologiae Thomas Aquinas argued that animals could be „loved 
from charity as good things we wish others to have, in that by charity we cherish 
this for God's honour and man‟s service‟.18 Peter Drum has summarised this 
position: Aquinas „argues that because animals feel pain they can be pitied, and 
persons who feel pity for animals‟ suffering are less likely to permit their fellows to 
suffer than those who do not. Hence the point of the law is human good, not that of 
animals‟.19 This was summarised somewhat more succinctly in London in 1612 by 
John Rawlinson who wrote „Save a beast‟s life and save a mans‟.20 For Aquinas 
animals have no qualities which are deserving in and of themselves, rather they are 
property which should be respected and which can enhance human qualities. The 
reason for the dismissal of any sense of animal moral worth is highlighted in Summa 
Contra Gentiles when Aquinas proposes 
 
 In the souls of brute animals ... there is no operation superior to those of the 
sensitive part, since they neither understand nor reason ... The souls of 
brutes, then, are incapable of any operation that does not involve the body. 
Now, since every substance is possessed of some operation, the soul of the 
brute animal will be unable to exist apart from its body; so that it perishes 
along with its body.21 
 
The animal is merely an instrument, it is not a moral agent. 
 By taking up what looks like a very Thomist reasoning in his adherence to the 
Romantic representation of nature, by making nature complete humanity, Bate is 
placing humanity at the centre and seeing the environment as, in Neil Sammells‟ 
phrase, „a moral exercise-yard‟.22 We affirm our own status through our relation to 
the natural world, we are not a part of the natural world other than as the 
recognisers of its beauty, value and significance. As Bate writes, there is in 
Romantic writers „an attempt to enable mankind the better to live in the material 
world by entering into harmony with the environment.‟23 The separation of 
humanity from environment here reiterates the anthropocentrism of earlier 
instrumentalist ideas. As an ecological stance it is a very dubious one. 
 But there are other problems as well. Despite a recognition that ecology 
represents a study of the whole of the natural world - organic and inorganic - what 
follows in Bate‟s work is a slippage from the use of the term ecology to the term 
environment and an avoidance of and silence about the place of non-human 
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animals. Green earth, fresh air and clear waters are the subjects of Bate‟s enquiry 
which might be termed not only Thomist but, to coin a phrase, inorgani-floracentric. 
In fact, the influence of Heidegger on Bate‟s more recent work, and the avoidance of 
discussion of the animal seem to go hand in hand when he discusses Hazlitt‟s 
argument that nature is „a universal home‟ which owes its power to „its endurance, 
its constancy.‟ Bate continues to paraphrase, and endorse Hazlitt‟s model: „A tree 
helps us to live because it is the same as the trees we saw in our childhood. If we 
destroy all the trees, we will irremediably disrupt not only the economy of nature 
but also our own social and psychological economy.‟24 If one tree is all trees then the 
impersonality of the tree is necessary. If we recognise something specific and 
individual in a tree we are automatically discounting the possibility of universality 
because if that one individualised tree dies we cannot replace it. We need, in 
following the Romantic relation to nature, to have a nature which transcends its 
individual elements: Nature with a capital N, if you like. Tom Regan, one of the 
principal proponents of animal rights, calls this refusal to individualise 
„environmental fascism‟. There is, Regan argues, an interest in „the stability, 
diversity and beauty of biotic communities‟ which ignores in dangerous ways the 
rights of the individual. Regan writes that this is „not seeing the forest for the trees - 
or, more accurately, ... not seeing the trees for the forest.‟25 
 This refusal to recognise the significance of the individual, or the proposition 
that the individual is significant only as a representative of the whole rather than 
worthy in and of itself sits comfortably with the Thomist echoes which resound in 
Bate‟s reliance on the Romantic representation of nature. The environment is 
separate from the human, it completes the human, and it is to be considered in 
general terms because it is so anthropocentrically important. Because of this many 
of the ideas proposed by Bate, while important in that they highlight the significance 
of ecological awareness in a reading of literary texts, are distanced from any 
meaningful relation to a literary or historical interest in animals because the 
anthropocentrism which remains in place in the Romantic picture of nature must be 
displaced if we are to truly reassess our place in the order of nature. 
 
A Way Forward 
 
This emphasis on the need to rethink the human is shown in various ways in all 
four of the essays in this special issue. Chris Mounsey‟s essay, „Edible Bulls and 
Drinkable Mice: eighteenth-century taxonomy and the crisis of Eden‟ looks at the 
ways in which language, which is usually understood, in Christian terms, to emerge 
from Adam‟s naming of the beasts in Genesis 2.19, failed in the face of the 
eighteenth-century discovery of animals like the platypus and the kangaroo, 
animals which challenged the established categories which organised the natural 
world. Mounsey looks at the work of the eighteenth-century writer Christopher 
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Smart to trace a new system to explain human language.  What emerges in 
Mounsey‟s essay is the fact that that which - post-Descartes - was assumed to 
represent the difference between human and animal - communication through 
language - remains explicable only through animals. As with anthropocentrism 
more generally, there is a reliance upon and a simultaneous denial of animals in 
this new system of language. 
 In her essay, „“That Ghastly Work”: Ruskin and Anatomy‟, Dinah Birch makes 
links between John Ruskin‟s aesthetic ideas and his stance against vivisection by 
reading his writings about anatomy and vivisection alongside his work on the role of 
the artist. If seeing is the true function of the artist, then seeing the bones, innards 
would seem to be a logical step. But Ruskin, Birch argues, distances himself from 
this: far from leading to a keener knowledge of the world the dismemberment of live 
animals (a truly vivid display of anthropocentrism) reduces the capacity for beauty 
and leaves only mechanics. Ultimately art cannot utilise this development in 
science, Ruskin argues; to preserve the realm of beauty the two must stand apart. 
Anthropocentrism here undermines the capacity to produce what might be seen as 
truly exceptional - even truly human: art. 
 Debbie Sly‟s reading of T.H. White‟s Arthurian cycle, „Natural Histories‟, traces 
the changes in the way in which White‟s characters relate to the natural world. 
Using the Second World War as the point of change, Sly argues that the 
hierarchical, medieval world view which can be traced in the earlier work gives way 
to an interpretation of the place of humanity in nature more influenced by 
nineteenth-century scientific developments, particularly evolution. The horrors of 
war - the clearest illustration of humanity‟s lack of humanity - is evidenced, Sly 
argues, in White‟s growing acknowledgement of the creatureliness of man (the 
masculine term is used deliberately). 
 Finally, in her essay on Alice Walker‟s The Temple of My Familiar Amanda 
Greenwood reads the link which Walker traces between women and animals, and 
using ecofeminist theory, defends Walker‟s alignment. Where the naturalisation of 
women and the feminisation of nature has been used to devalue both women and 
nature in patriarchal discourse, Graham argues that in Walker‟s story the 
alignment is actually a celebratory one - a recognition that oppression can create 
in the oppressed a sense of community with other oppressed groups, and that in 
this sense of community can be found a more „human‟ mode of existence. In this 
sense, phallocentrism leads not only to the oppression of women (and of animals) 
but to the dehumanisation of the male, and paradoxically, to a restatement of 
status by those who appear to have none. 
 Ultimately, all of the essays in this issue offer very different ways of thinking 
about the possibility of reading animals. What they have in common is, perhaps, a 
recognition that it is through the animal that we can begin to think again about 
our own status as human which will, in turn, impact upon our relationship with 
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animals. In recognising this anthropocentrism is not merely acknowledged, it is 
actually undercut. To be human we need the animal, but in this necessity lies a 
recognition of the impossibility of being the thing we proclaim ourselves naturally 
to be. In this recognition we are turning anthropocentrism against itself. We do not 
just accept that we need animals and therefore should protect animals (an 
anthropocentric vision of the world, not unlike that held by the Romantics), rather, 
we acknowledge that our reliance upon them bespeaks a wider environmental 
concern; that of the status of the human itself. If we can place ourselves under 
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